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Abstract Recently, Chou et al. [Electron Commer Res, DOI 10.1007/s10660-
014-9143-6] presented a novel controlled quantum secure direct communication
protocol which can be used for online shopping. The authors claimed that their
protocol was immune to the attacks from both external eavesdropper and internal
betrayer. However, we find that this protocol is vulnerable to the attack from
internal betrayer. In this paper, we analyze the security of this protocol to show
that the controller in this protocol is able to eavesdrop the secret information
of the sender (i.e., the customer’s shopping information), which indicates that it
cannot be used for secure online shopping as the authors expected. Moreover, an
improvement to resist the controller’s attack is proposed.
Keywords Quantum cryptography · Quantum secure direct communication ·
Cryptanalysis · E-Commerce · Online shopping
1 Introduction
With the rapid development of the Internet and related technologies, E-commerce,
which is one of the most significant scientific accomplishments brought by Internet,
is playing an increasingly important role in modern life. As a key component of
E-commerce, online shopping has become one of the most important shopping
ways in people’s everyday life. In 2013, the daily transaction volume of online
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shopping in the world reaches billions of dollars. Therefore, security and privacy
have naturally become an essential requirement for online shopping.
So far, the security and privacy of E-commerce has been guaranteed by the
classical cryptosystems whose security is based on the assumptions of computa-
tion complexity. Nevertheless, with the development of quantum algorithms and
quantum computer [1,2], these classical cryptosystems are facing more and more
challenges. To address the potential threat posed by quantum computation to
classical cryptosystems, people begin to research new cryptographic technology,
such quantum cryptography. Quantum cryptography, whose security is relied on
the quantum mechanics principles rather than the assumptions of computation
complexity, has become a hotspot of cryptography. Since the pioneering work of
Bennett and Brassard in 1984[3], much attention has been focused on quantum
cryptography, which includes quantum key distribution (QKD) [3,4,5,6,7], quan-
tum secret sharing (QSS) [8,9,10,11,12], quantum secret direct communication
(QSDC) [13,14,15,16,17], quantum watermark (QW) [18,19,20] and quantum se-
cure multiparty computation (QSMC) [21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30], etc.
Quantum cryptography has also been utilized to assure the security and privacy
in E-commence. In 2010, Wen presented an E-payment protocol by utilizing quan-
tum group signature, in which a trusted third party is required [31]. To enhance
the robustness of the system, Wen and Nie presented another E-payment protocol
by employing quantum blind and group signature, where two trusted third parties
are needed [32]. Nevertheless, both the two protocols can only be applied to the
cases where business transactions happen within the same bank. While in real
life, many business transactions occur between different banks. In addition, an E-
payment system, which supports secure inter-bank transactions, should be desired
from the view of practical application. In order to settle this problem and support
unconditionally secure E-payment between two different banks, Wen et al. pre-
sented an inter-bank E-payment protocol based on quantum poxy blind signature
in 2013 [33]. Unfortunately, Cai and Wei found that this protocol is susceptible
to denial-of-service attack. Moreover, they also show that the dishonest merchant
can succeed to change the purchase information of the customer in this protocol
[34].
It is known that design and cryptanalysis have always been important branches
of cryptography. Both of them drive the development of this field. In fact, crypt-
analysis is an important and interesting work in quantum cryptography [35,36]. It
estimates the security level of a protocol, finds potential loopholes, and tries to ad-
dress security issues. As pointed out by Lo and Ko, breaking cryptographic systems
was as important as building them [37]. To date, many kinds of attacks strategies
have been presented, such as entanglement swapping attack [38], intercept-resend
attack [39], Correlation-Extractability attack [40,41], Trojan horse attack [42] and
participant attack [43,44,45].
Recently, Chou et al. presented a novel controlled QSDC protocol which can be
used for online shopping [46]. By utilizing this protocol, the online shopping mall
could control the shopping process, hence shopping information of the customer
could be more secure. For the sake of simplicity, we call it CLZ protocol hereafter.
The authors made a simple security analysis of the CLZ protocol to show its
immunity to the attacks from both external eavesdropper and internal betrayer.
Unfortunately, we find that this protocol is susceptible to the attack from the
internal betrayer. In this paper, we make an analysis to illustrate that this protocol
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cannot provide unconditional security for online shopping, since the controller
of this protocol is able eavesdrop the secret information of the sender (i.e., the
customer’s shopping information). Moreover, we propose an improvement of the
CLZ protocol to close this security loophole. In next section, we make a brief
introduction of the CLZ protocol. In section 3, we make an analysis of the CLZ
protocol to show its vulnerability to the internal attack from a dishonest controller.
After that, we improve CLZ protocol to be secure against the presented attack.
2 Brief review of the CLZ protocol and its application
Herein we make a brief description of the CLZ protocol [46]. Then we introduce
how this protocol can be applied to online shopping.
2.1 The CLZ protocol
Different from the BB84 [3] protocol in which only one photon is transmitted at
a time, the photons in CLZ protocol are transmitted by utilizing the technique of
block transmission which has been proposed firstly by Long et al. [13]. In this pro-
tocol, Alice, Bob, and Charlie are supposed to be the information sender, receiver
and controller, respectively. If Alice wants to transmit a secret message of N bits
directly to Bob under the control of Charlie, they could execute this protocol as
the following steps.
(1) Controller prepares for the quantum information carriers. Charlie prepares a
sequence of N+δ single qubits, each of which is randomly in one of following
four states {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉}, where
|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉), (1)
and the sequence is denoted as S0. After that, he sends S0 to Alice.
(2) Eavesdropping check for the first transmission. After the reception of S0, Al-
ice begins to check eavesdropping with Charlie as follows. Alice randomly se-
lects δ single qubits from S0 and randomly chooses a measuring basis Z-basis
or X-basis, measuring the selected qubits for checking eavesdropping. After-
wards, Alice informs Charlie of the information including which bases she uses,
the positions of selected qubits and the corresponding measurement outcomes.
With the information from Alice, Charlie could determine whether there ex-
ists eavesdropping in the first transmission. If there exists eavesdropping, they
abort the protocol; otherwise, Alice throws away the qubits used for checking
eavesdropping and continue to the next step.
(3) Sender encodes the secret information. Alice encodes her secret messageM on
the remaining N qubits as follows. If the i-th bit of M is 0/1, Alice performs
operation I/iσy on the i-th one of the remaining qubits, where
I = |0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|, iσy = |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈0|. (2)
After that, she generates δ decoy qubits which are randomly in one of the four
states in {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉} and inserts them randomly into the sequence S0.
Then Alice send the new sequence (denoted as S1) to Bob.
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(4) Eavesdropping checking for the second transmission. After Bob receives S1 from
Alice, Alice informs Bob of the positions of the decoy qubits, Bob measures
each of the decoy qubits randomly in Z-basis or X-basis. After that, Bob tells
Alice which bases he uses and the corresponding measurement outcomes. Ac-
cording to the information announced by Bob, Alice could determine whether
there exists eavesdropping during the transmission of S1 . If there exists eaves-
dropping, they stop the protocol; otherwise, Bob could get the secret message
with the help of Charlie as follows.
(5) Receiver deduces the secret message with the controller’s help. Bob discards
the δ qubits used for checking eavesdropping and now only remains N single
qubits. Without Charlie’s permission, Bob is unable to obtain Alices secret
message. Only after Charlie publishes the initial states of the N single qubits,
can Bob recover Alice’s secret messageM by comparing with the initial states.
Concretely, if the initial state of a qubit is |0〉 or |1〉 (|+〉 or |−〉), Bob measure
it in Z-basis (X-basis). And the corresponding bit of M is 0 (1) provided the
measurement outcome is the same as (different with) the initial state.
This proposed protocol could also be extended to a multiparty controllers ver-
sion. Take the two controllers version as a example. Suppose the two controllers,
Charlie and Dave, both have the ability to control Alice and Bob’s communica-
tion. Some modifications are required in step (1) and step (5). In step (1), after
Charlie prepares the qubit sequence, he sends it to Dave instead of Alice. Upon
Dave receives these photons, he make an eavesdropping check as Alice does in step
(2). To change the states of qubits, Dave performs randomly operation I or iσy
on each of the remaining qubits, then he sends these qubits to Alice like original
step (1) does. In the new step 5, Bob need ask Charlie to reveal the initial states
he prepared and Dave to publish the operations he had performed. After Bob gets
all the information, he is able to deduce M .
2.2 The application of the CLZ protocol on online shopping
Herein we introduce how the CLZ protocol can complete the online shopping
process [46]. In this example, eBay is considered as the online shopping mall, and
the detail steps can be described as follows.
(a) Both seller and costumer register as eBay members.
(b) eBay authenticates the identities of seller and costumer.
(c) Once the customer decides to buy items from the seller, he/she asks eBay
to transmit a sequence of single qubits randomly in {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉} via
quantum channel, but without knowing its initial states.
(d) After checking the security of the transmitted qubits, customer encodes his/her
shopping information on those photons by performing the corresponding uni-
tary operations as described in steps (2) and (3). The shopping information
includes customer ID, item number, etc. Once the encoding is finished, those
encoded photons will be sent to the seller.
(e) Again, the security checking on these transmitted qubits is needed. If the trans-
mission is secure, seller will ask eBay for the initial states of these photons.
With the encoded qubits and their initial states, seller could deduce the shop-
ping information of the customer.
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3 Security analysis and improvement of the CLZ protocol
In this section, we analyze the security of the CLZ protocol to show that it is
susceptible to attack from a dishonest controller. Specifically, we first explain how
a dishonest controller could eavesdrop the secret information of the sender in
the CLZ protocol. Then we illustrate that, by utilizing this strategy, a dishonest
online shopping mall can eavesdrop the customer’s shopping information in the
application of online shopping. Finally, we introduce our improvement of the CLZ
protocol to close the corresponding security loophole.
3.1 Security analysis
In Ref. [46], the authors make a simple analysis to show that the CLZ protocol is
secure against the attacks from both external eavesdropper and internal betrayer.
In each transmission of the quantum information carriers in the CLZ protocol,
there are δ decoy qubits, which are randomly in the four states {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉}
and randomly inserted in the qubit sequence. After receives the qubit sequence,
the receiver measures each of the decoy qubits randomly in Z-basis or X-basis.
Whatever kind of attack an external eavesdropper utilizes, his/her eavesdropping
action will introduces disturbance into the eavesdropping check with a certain
probability. The reason is that the process for eavesdropping check done in this
protocol, in essence, is the same as that in the BB84 QKD protocol [3], which has
been proved unconditional secure. Hence, the CLZ is indeed secure against the
external attacks.
However, an internal betrayer of a multiparty quantum cryptographic proto-
col may has more power to attack the protocol than an external eavesdropper.
First, he/she can know partial information legally. Second, he can tell a lie in the
process of eavesdropping check to avoid introducing errors. Therefore, the attacks
from dishonest participants are generally more powerful and should be paid more
attention to [23,24,25]. The authors of the CLZ protocols said that this proto-
col could resist the attacks from both the information receiver and the controller.
That is, the receiver Bob could not get the secret message M without the help of
the controller Charlie. Also Charlie is unable to get M without leaving a trace in
the eavesdropping check.
We admit that, no matter what kind of attack Charlie employs in the CLZ
protocol, once he could get partial information of M , her action will introduce
errors into the eavesdropping check and hence make the protocol aborted. In fact,
this condition is sufficient to ensure the security of a QKD protocol, but it is not
enough to guarantee the security of the CLZ protocol since it is a QSDC protocol.
Different from QKD, the purpose of which is to establish a private random key, the
purpose of QSDC is to directly transmit a secret message [13,14,15,16,17]. In a
QKD protocol, if the eavesdropper’s action is detected in the eavesdropping check,
the transmitted qubits can be abandoned as they do not carry any information
about the secret message. On the contrary, in a QSDC protocol, the secret message
is directly encoded on the transmitted qubits. Hence, QSDC has higher security
requirements than QKD. On the one hand, the eavesdropping check in a secure
QSDC protocol should detect the eavesdropper’s attack. On the other hand, a
secure QSDC protocol should leak none useful information of the secret message
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to the eavesdropper. In other words, once the eavesdropper has already gotten any
useful information of the secret message, the QSDC protocol is insecure even if
the eavesdropper’s attack has been detected in the eavesdropping check.
Unfortunately, the CLZ protocol could not simultaneously satisfy both the two
security requirements. In this protocol, if Charlie wants to eavesdrop the secret
message M , he could execute the following strategy. In step (3), when Alice sends
out the sequence S1, Charlie intercepts the travelling sequence S1 and stores it.
Instead, he prepares another sequence S′1 of N+δ qubits to replace S1 and sends it
Bob. After Bob receives the sequence S′1, Alice will announce the positions of the
δ decoy qubits. Once Charlie gets this information, he discards the corresponding
decoy qubits in S1. Then he could easily deduce M with the remaining N qubits
and their initial states. It should be pointed out this attacking strategy will in-
evitably introduce errors into the eavesdropping check. Thus, the protocol will be
aborted by Alice and Bob according to step (4). Even so, Alice and Bob could
only determine that there exists eavesdropping in the transmission. That is to say,
they will not suspect Charlie as the eavesdropper. So far, we have shown that the
controller Charlie in the CLZ protocol could easily get the whole secret messageM
beyond suspicion. Accordingly, the application of the CLZ protocol given above,
i.e., online-shopping, also have the same security loophole. Specifically, the online
shopping mall (i.e., eBay) could utilize this strategy to get the customer’s shopping
information in the application of online shopping.
3.2 Improvement of the CLZ protocol
Herein we give an improvement of the CLZ protocol in order to close the security
loophole introduced above. To close the corresponding loophole, we only need to
respectively substitute steps (3)-(5) of the CLZ protocol with the steps (3’)-(5’)
given below.
(3’) Sender encodes the secret information. Before encoding her secret information,
Alice first generates anN -bit random binary stringK. Then she encodesK⊕M
on the remaining N qubits as follows (Here ⊕ represents XOR operation). If
the i-th bit of K⊕M is 0/1, Alice performs operation I/iσy on the i-th one
of the remaining qubits. After that, she generates δ decoy qubits which are
randomly in one of the four states in {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉} and inserts them
randomly into the sequence S0. Then Alice sends the new sequence (denoted
as S1) to Bob.
(4’) Eavesdropping checking for the second transmission. After Bob receives S1 from
Alice, Alice informs Bob of the positions of the decoy qubits, Bob measures
each of the decoy qubits randomly in Z-basis or X-basis. After that, Bob tells
Alice which bases he uses and the corresponding measurement outcomes. Ac-
cording to the information announced by Bob, Alice could determine whether
there exists eavesdropping during the transmission of S1 . If there exists eaves-
dropping, they stop the protocol; otherwise, Alice publishes the binary string
K. Then Bob could get the secret message with the help of Charlie and K in
the next step.
(5’) Receiver deduces the secret message with the controller’s help. Bob discards
the δ qubits used for checking eavesdropping and now only remains N single
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qubits. Without Charlie’s permission, Bob is unable to obtain Alices secret
message. Only after Charlie publishes the initial states of the N single qubits,
can Bob recover the binary string K⊕M by comparing with the initial states.
Concretely, if the initial state of a qubit is |0〉 or |1〉 (|+〉 or |−〉), Bob measure
it in Z-basis (X-basis). And the corresponding bit of K⊕M is 0 (1) provided
the measurement outcome is the same as (different with) the initial state. Once
obtaining K⊕M , Bob could deduce M with the string K announced by Alice.
Now we show that this improvement can be used to close the above security
loophole of the CLZ protocol. As analyzed in section 3.1, the process for eaves-
dropping check done in the CLZ protocol, in essence, is the same as that in the
BB84 QKD protocol [3]. Therefore, no matter what kind of attack the eavesdrop-
per (both the external eavesdropper and internal betrayer) utilizes, once he/she
has obtained any useful information about K⊕M , he/his attacking action will
unavoidably leave a trace in (i.e., introduce errors into ) the check. Then the
protocol will be stopped before Alice publish the binary string K. Since K is a
random binary string known only by Alice, even if the eavesdropper get any useful
information about K⊕M , he/she knows nothing about M since K will not be
published anymore. Till now, we have shown that the improved CLZ protocol is
secure against all the present attack, since whatever kind of attack the eavesdrop-
per uses, he/she could get none useful information about M but be noticed in the
eavesdropping check. Accordingly, by utilizing the improved version, the applica-
tion of the improved CLZ protocol in online shopping could also be immune to all
the present attack.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we make a cryptanalysis of the CLZ protocol, which can be used for
online shopping, to show that it has a security loophole. Concretely, we point out
that the controller of the CLZ protocol is able to obtain the whole secret message
of the sender. Then, we improve this protocol to be secure against all the present
attacks.
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